Notes on the progressive as a "partialization" operator by Bertinetto, Pier Marco
39
Pier Marco Bertinetto
Notes on the progressive as a ÔpartializationÕ operator.
(work in progress)
1. Introduction.*
The attempt at formalizing the semantics of the progressive has given rise, in the past three
decades or so, to a number of proposals. It is not an easy task to sum up in little space this
development, making justice to all scholars who took position in this debate. The difficulty of
the endeavour is increased by the fact that the various tendencies are mutually intertwined, so
that it is sometimes impossible to assign a given contribution exclusively to one or another
line of thought. The competent reader will certainly detect a number of over-simplifications
in this account. Despite this, I believe the assessment presented here is fair enough to yield a
comprehensive view (cf. also Rohrer 1981, which provides a useful summary of the early
stages of this development).
To make things clear from the beginning, I propose to isolate the following stages:
(i) The seminal works by Montague (1970), Scott (1970) and Bennett & Partee (1972);
(ii) The proposal, shaped in terms of modal logic, pur forth by Dowty (1979);
(iii) The entirely new proposal by Parsons (1988), which takes the progressive as an
Òactionality sensitiveÓ operator;
(iv) The recent developments which insist on the idea that the progressive be a
ÒpartializationÓ operator, i.e. as a device which highlights only a portion of the event.
As the quotations show, this list corresponds to some extent to a chronological sequence.
However, except for the very first one, it is not always the case that each stage is totally
superseded or inglobated by the following. Although each new proposal is designed with the
purpose of solving specific problems left open by the preceding literature, no treatment put
forth so far has been able to accomodate all the theoretical data. Indeed, one often observes
that while a (certain set of) proposal(s) looks appropriate for solving a given cluster of
problems, it also seems to leave open other important issues. Another fact that I would like to
point out at the outset is that, with very few exceptions, virtually all papers in the formal
semantics literature (concerning the progressive) deal exclusively with English. Moreover,
they concentrate on what I would like to call the ÒprototypicalÓ usage of the progressive.
However, the notion ÒprogressiveÓ is a fuzzy one, which presents peripheral as well as core
meanings (not to speak of the considerable variation among languages).1 Nevertheless,
although no final assessment will be reached until all usages of the progressive will be
formally expressed in a satisfactory way, it is fair to say that any attempt at finding an
explanation should begin with the most typical usages.
2. Accounting for the Ôimperfective paradoxÕ.
Bennett & Partee (1972) riformulated a previous proposal by Scott (1970) and Montague
(1970). Minor details aside, they essentially suggested the following solution (where ÒProg
(f)Ó stands for a sentence containing a progressive):
(I) Prog (f) is true at interval t iff there is an interval tÕ, such that t is a non-final
subinterval of tÕ, and f is true at tÕ.
This definition captures the intuitive idea that an event expressed by the progressive is
viewed as a phase of a larger event of the same kind. Consider the following example:
(1) When Mary phoned, Igor was having a shower.
* I wish to thank the following people for their very useful suggestions and comments: Denis Delfitto,
sten Dahl, Luca Dini, Vittorio Di Tomaso, Alessandro Lenci, Mario Squartini. I have to admit that I did
not include all their suggestions; not because I fond a better solution, but rather out of my imperfect
comprehension of the subtleties of the formal language. I simply did not dare to go any further in this
territory which remains largely misterious to me.
1 On the matter of typological variation, cf. Bertinetto (1995) and Bertinetto et al. (to appear).
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Here, one may easily imagine a situation such that, at the time when the telephone rang (let us
call it Òfocalization pointÓ, henceforth FP), the event of having a shower was taking place,
and the same event carried on for some time afterwards. However, there is no requirement
that the event should continue beyond the FP, for it is equally plausible that Igor interrupted
his shower to answer the call and never resumed it. The higher or lower plausibility of one or
another situational development depends very much on the kind of event, and on the context
(see below), but it is enough to observe that the event must not necessarily continue beyond
the FP, for us to conclude that definition (I) is not a very accurate statement. This can be seen
in particular with accomplishment verbs, such as: build a house, draw a picture and the like.
Indeed, according to definition (I), one might be led to the conclusion that (2,a) entails (2,b):
(2) a. Ed was building his house
b. Ed built his house.
However, progressive sentences based on telic verbs do not allow this entailment. This
observation, put forth by several authors since at least Garey (1957), is generally known as
the Òimperfective paradoxÓ, although the denomination is not particularly felicitous.Ê2
DowtyÕs (1979) proposal was specifically devised to remedy this flaw. His suggestion was
to consider, among the possible worlds subsequent to FP, those that instantiate the
continuation of the event up to its natural conclusion, i.e. up to the full attainment of telicity
in the case of telic predicate. In order for this treatment to be effective, Dowty adds the
condition that the relevant possible worlds wÕ be connected to the real world w by an Òinertial
linkÓ, such that they are a natural development of the preceding situation (i.e., w is exactly
like wÕ at all moments leading to the relevant portion of wÕ ). This can be formulated in the
following way:
(II) Prog (f) is true at interval t in w iff for some interval tÕ, such that t is a non-final
subinterval of tÕ, and for all wÕ standing in an inertial relation with w,  f is true at
<tÕ, wÕ>.
With this reformulation, the entailment from (2,a) to (2,b) may plausibly be defended.
Although the event of building might have been interrupted beyond FP, nothing prevents us
from imagining a possible world where the event carries on and the completion of the event
occurs.
However, as several authors (to whom I cannot make justice here) have pointed out, there
are conceivable events for which no obvious continuation of a progressive event may be
envisaged. Consider the following sentence:
(3) Max was crossing the street, when he was hit by a truck.
Here it is unlikely that Max eventually managed to reach the other end of the street, for this
would force us to suspend the physical laws which regulate our world.
Considerations such as these led, through a very intense discussion, to the completely new
proposal formulated by Parsons (1988). According to this view, the progressive is taken not
only as an aspectual operator, but above all as an Òactionality sensitiveÓ operator, i.e. as a
device which demands atelic verbs, or turns (when necessary) telic verbs into atelic ones. To
achieve this, Parsons allows the progressive to instantiate an abstract predicate HOLD, which
is satisfied precisely at the focalized interval of time:
(III) Prog (f) is true at interval t of event e iff e holds at t.
In ParsonsÕ analysis, HOLD is defined as a stative predicate, so that the actional character of
Prog (f) is considered to be stative. Since, as is well-known, the progressive cannot apply to
originally stative verbs,Ê3 this proposal amounts to claiming that whatever the actional
character of the verb (activity, achievement or accomplishment), the progressive turns it into
2 A better denomination would be Òtelicity paradoxÓ, for telicity is what is really involved. In fact, with
atelic verbs things change altogether, as is shown by Tony was sleeping,  which does entail that Tony
slept.
3 There are, as is well-known, apparent exceptions to this statement. For a discussion, cf. Bertinetto (1994).
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a stative one. This is coherent with the views expressed by several authors (such as
Langacker 1987, Mittwoch 1988, Mufwene 1984, Saurer 1984, Vlach 1981 and 1993),
according to which progressive sentences present strict analogies with sentences containing
stative verbs. The very exclusion of stative predicates from progressive sentences would be
due to the fact that the application of the progressive operator would be purely redundant in
these cases. However, this view cannot be maintained as such, for it can be demonstrated that
sentences containing stative verbs may convey a wide range of aspectual values, which are
only in part accessible to progressive sentences. Indeed, as Bertinetto (1994) has shown, the
analogy between stative and progressive sentences holds just when the former instantiate a
typical progressive situation, in which the state of affairs is viewed as valid at a given FP.
Obviously, this reduces the analogy to a truism. There is however a way to incorporate the
essence of ParsonsÕ proposal, without adhering to the corollary relative to the stativity of
Prog (f). This consists in assuming that HOLD (or whatever abstract predicate one wishes to
postulate) is an activity predicate, which applies freely to activity verbs and turns telic verbs
(achievements and accomplishments) into activities, i.e. into the only atelic class compatible
with progressivity. As to statives, they may receive a progressive interpretation in the relevant
contexts; but since they normally cannot assume the progressive morphology, we may
suppose that they remain inert to the abstract predicate HOLD (cf. again fn.3 for some
details).
Whatever is the case, it is clear that ParsonsÕ solution dissolves the Òimperfective
paradoxÓ. Consider again (3). Since crossing the street  is turned by the progressive into an
atelic verb (i.e. the pure activity of Òstreet-crossingÓ), there is no reason to be bothered by the
fact that the telicity of the verb will never be satisfied in any possible world. But what
happens then if, subsequent to uttering (2,a), EdÕs house is eventually completed? The answer
that ParsonsÕs proposal suggests (in the reinterpretation given here) is that the situation
considered at FP is the mere instantiation of an activity of Òhouse-buildingÓ, which in itself
says absolutely nothing with respect to the subsequent development of the event. The fact
that the house is eventually completed is totally immaterial to the semantics of (2,a).
Note, however, that although one might agree that the continuation of the event beyond FP
is totally irrelevant for the formal definition of the progressive, this problem cannot be
neglected from the point of view of our capacity to draw textual inferences. Supposing that
ParsonsÕ definition provides a satisfatory account of the semantics of the progressive, it is
nevertheless the case that an expert system (just as human speakers) should be able to make
plausible inferences as to the further development of a progressive contained in a narration.
This is precisely the starting point assumed by Asher (1992).
It is important to realize that AsherÕs contribution should be taken as an account of the
pragmatics of the progressive, i.e. as an assessment of its textual usage and of the inferences
that it may lead to, rather than as a truly semantic account. In fact, he does not even discuss
examples presenting atelic verbs, for which he has nothing relevant to say. From this point of
view, there is little doubt that Parsons proposal provides a superior solution. But with respect
to the specific goal that Asher has in mind, it cannot be denied that the idea he puts forth, cast
in terms of non-monotonic logic, is very ingenious. His approach consists in assuming that
any progressive involves a set of ÒperspectivesÓ on the event, based on our knowledge of the
world. For instance, with respect to (3) the most natural course of events dictates that Max
never managed to cross the street. The argument goes as follows: Normally, when one
crosses a street, s/he typically gets eventually to the other side; however, in particular cases,
such as the one we are considering, Òa more specific default rule applies, and this application
defeats the use of the more general statementÓ (p.471). Note that in quite a lot of cases our
inferences are less straightforward. The following is an extreme example (4):
(4) Irene was cooking fish stew, but the cat was eating the fish.
Here there is a conflict between two possible courses of events, to the effect that they cannot
both be fulfilled. Obviously, we cannot state on principled grounds which one will be carried
out to its final goal. However, it is equally abvious that each of them, if not contrasted, would
reach its goal. As Asher puts it: ÒIt suffices for the truth of the progressive that there be just
one perspective p on the state s such that the normal course of events based on having a state
with characteristics given in p leads to a completion of the appropriate kindÓ (p.479). Thus, in
a case like (5), although we are uncertain as to the final result, we may nevertheless
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reasonably assert that there is at least one perspective compatible with the completion of the
event:
(5) Franz was crossing a minefield.
As can be seen, AsherÕs proposal is a return to DowtyÕs basic intuition, the difference
being that modal logic is replaced by a non-monotonic approach. There may still be a
problem, though. Consider the following case, imagining that the sentence is uttered on the
beach by proud Little Eveline:
(6) Look daddy, I am emptying the sea with a spoon.
Suppose that little Eveline is persuaded that she is performing a perfectly reasonable thing.
According to the physical laws that regulate our universe, there is no ÒnormalÓ (or typical)
perspective, according to which the event may be completed. One could then imagine a
different universe, but this would make AsherÕs solution unfalsifiable, hence vacuous. There
would be no justification for the notion Ònormal course of eventsÓ if this could be suspended
at will. Yet, (6) is a legitimate instantiation of the progressive, given the circumstances. Even
an example such as: Phil was jumping to the moon from the roof of his house, although
admittedly hard to swallow, could be accepted if referred to the persuasion of an insane
person. This suggests that, after all, any attempt at incorporating a solution to the
Òimperfective paradoxÓ into the semantics of the progressive is probably bound to fail. There
are clearly ÒimpossibleÓ events which can be described by means of a progressive sentence.
3. On the progressive as an Ôactionality  sensitiveÕ operator.
Interestingly, a Parsons-like approach would not be challenged by (4-6). In each of these
cases, the event would be viewed as ÒholdingÓ at FP, regardless of the subsequent course of
events. However, even ParsonsÕ approach is not immune from difficulties. Consider the case
of Òinherently telicÓ verbs. These cannot be detelicized by any of the devices commonly used
for this purpose, such as the adverbials Òfor X TimeÓ or Òuntil txÓ, as is shown by (7,a) as
opposed to (7,b):
(7) a. ?? The doctor extracted a tooth for five minutes / until the clock rang
b. Molly draw a picture for five minutes / until the clock rang.
It belongs to our deepest ethical persuasion that a surgical operation such as that in (7,a)
cannot be voluntarily interrupted. Thus, this type of event is inherently telic, in contrast to
events such as that in (7,b) which can easily be detelicized (or, as some scholars would put it,
are ambiguous with respect to telicity). Yet, we can meaningfully say something like:
(8) Suddenly, while the doctor was extracting the aching tooth from the patient, the roof
collapsed.
This shows that the progressive may very naturally be employed even with inherently telic
predicates, although the usual detelicizing tools are normally incompatible with them.
Consequently, the most relevant function of the progressive cannot be that of detelicizing
telic predicates, as assumed by Parsons (and indeed detelicizing adverbials like those in (7)
are incompatible with the progressive itself). This can be observed also with achievement
verbs, a subclass of telic predicates. According to ParsonsÕ treatment, the progressive should
transform an achievement into an atelic predicate, i.e. into an activity (or even, in his original
formulation, into a stative). This might, in fact, account for the impression of durativization
that speakers often perceive in sentences such as (9,a). However, as (9,b) demonstrates, these
contexts are not compatible with durative adverbials, even in languages which allow for them
in the combination of perfective tenses and durative verbs, as in (9,c): 4
4 The reason why I present here a Spanish example, is that the combination of these adverbials with the
progressive is not accepted by all English speakers. As to Contemporary Italian, this combination is
totally excluded by the ungrammaticality of the progressive with perfective tenses (in fact, that this
particular type of temporal adverbials demands perfective tenses, as shown in Bertinetto 1986).
Mario Squartini has pointed out to me the following sentence, found in a Spanish novel:
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(9) a. Pedro estaba saliendo / muriendo / gaando
P.   was-IMP leaving / dying  / winning
b. * Pedro estuvo saliendo / muriendo / gaando durante dos horas
  P.  was-PRET leaving / dying  / winning for    two hours
c. Pedro estuvo tocando el piano / comiendo / curriendo durante dos horas
P.  was-PRET playing the piano / eating  / running  for two hours.
What all this seems to tell us is the following. First, the progressive does not operate on
the telic value of the predicate, witness (7,a) with respect to (8). This does not mean,
however, that the imperfective paradox costitutes, as stressed by Dowty, a major problem for
the semantic treatment of the progressive. On the contrary, the possibly strict telicity of the
verb is totally irrelevant for its employment (cf. (8) again). Second, the progressive does not
durativize non-durative verbs, witness (9,b). This can also be gathered from examples based
on Òstrictly punctualÓ verbs (Dini & Bertinetto 1995), which (in contrast to normal
achievements) only allow for a reading where the event is seen as actually occurring at FP.
Consider:
(10) a. At that very moment, Luca was pressing the button
b. At that very moment, the bullet was hitting the target
c. At that very moment, the rocket was touching the ground of the misterious
planet.
It is not easy, in these sentences, to get the imminential reading that is commonly available to
true achievements. This is due to the fact that strictly punctual verbs do not involve any
preparatory phase. Thus, there is no way to yield an effect of apparent ÒdurativizationÓ of the
event, as is the case with achievements. Besides, since punctuals merely consist of a single
ÒatomÓ of event, once they start they necessarily ÒoccurÓ: the event may not be suspended.
Yet, the progressive may be employed even with these verbs, provided the relevant pragmatic
conditions obtain. This is a striking exception to the general rule, stating that a progressive
event needs not reach its completion. Clearly, this statement is subject to pragmatic
restrictions, for some events may not possibly be interrupted.
Even if one wished to contend that punctuals are a fairly specific class of verbs, for which
special stipulations should be made, there are further arguments suggesting that achievements
and accomplishments differ in significant ways, to the effect that we cannot simply conceive
of progressive achievements as predicates that are contextually turned into activities (i.e. the
kind of predicates which detelicized accomplishments are turned into). Compare the
following cases:
(11) The wounded man was brought moribund to the hospital:
a. he died half an hour later
b. * he finished dying in half an hour.
(12) The author left to her holidays place with the first draft of her book in the suitcase:
a. * she wrote it two weeks later
b. she finished writing it in two weeks.
The achievement in (11) and the accomplishment in (12) show a simmetrical behaviour in
contexts (a-b). As it happens, the event of dying includes a preparatory phase, but the
culminating phase instantiates something completely new, occurring at the end of the
preparatory phase. By contrast, the event of writing a book is truly durative: every moment
comprised in this interval of time is a phase of writing. Thus, when the progressive applies to
an achievement, there is no way to derive from it a detelicized accomplishment (i.e. an
activity). A progressive achievement may correspond either (i) to the culmination phase, in
which case we obtain a situation comparable to that described in (10) above; or (ii) to the
preparatory phase, in which case we get the so-called imminential meaning. But even in the
(i) Estuvo muriendo durante siete aos
be-Past-3sg dying       for    seven  years.
This seems to be a case of durativization of an achievement. However, it is fair to consider it a hyperbolic
usage, i.e. a rhethorical violation of the normal restrictions impinging on this class of verbs.
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latter case, the event retains its actional properties, which are clearly different from those that
are typical of an accomplishment.
As a consequence of all this, it is wrong to view the progressive as an Òactionality
sensitiveÓ operator, whose main function consists in checking, and possibly changing, the
actional nature of the predicate. Its function is purely aspectual, and presumably resides in its
being a Òpartialization operatorÓ on the event. In the remainder of this paper, I shall examine
a few recent proposals, all of which agree on the claim that the progressive be a device which
presents only a portion of the event, rather than a complete event.
4. The progressive as a ÔpartializationÕ operator.
First consider Landman (1992). An important ingredient of his approach is the distinction
between the Òpart-ofÓ and the Òstage-ofÓ relation. ÒAn event is a stage of another event if the
second can be regarded as a more developed version of the firstÓ (p.23). Furthermore, in
order to be a stage Òa part has to be big enough and share enough with [the event] e so that we
can call it a less developed version of eÓ (ibid.). Note however that an event can be a part of
another event, without being a stage of it. For instance, reading a book may be regarded as
part of preparing an exam, without it being a stage of the latter, for the exam may eventually
be prepared even though the book is not read to the end. In fact, Òwe cannot say that when an
event stops in a world, there is no bigger event of which it is part in that world, but we can
say that when it stops, there is no bigger event in the world of which it is a stageÓ (ibid.).
Suppose now that e, f, g, h É are the various stages of the event of reading a book, and that
they are linked pairwise to one another in such a way that they build up a Òcontinuation
branchÓ of the event e in the worlds to which they pairwise belong (for instance, e and f
belong to w, f  and g belong to wÕ, g and h to wÓ, and so on).
Informally, here is LandmanÕs definition of the progressive:
(IV) PROG (e, P) is true in w relative to f if in some world on the continuation branch of
f(e) in w, some event realizes the event type P.
According to this definition, example (3) would be treated like this. ÒWe follow MaxÕs
crossing in w until it stops because the truck hits him. We go to the closest world where his
crossing continues. There the truck doesnÕt hit him. On the basis of his crossing and his usual
skill of road-crossing he had a very reasonable chance of getting in the real world as far as he
gets in this world. In this world he manages to crossÓ (p.28-29, with adaptations). But what
happens with (6)? As formulated, LandmanÕs solution requires that there be a world in which
the event type is realized, but we saw above that in certain cases it is quite unlikely that the
event may be completed. The event of empting the sea with a spoon by little Eveline may go
on for some time after FP, but there is no world in which it will ever be completed.
Ultimately, LandmanÕs is a revitalization of DowtyÕs approach, and seems to meet the same
difficulties.
Kearns (1991) has a different approach. Her conception rests on the idea that the
progressive locates the event Òat leastÓ at the stated time (our FP), thus implying that the
event may (but needs not) continue beyond FP. With some adaptations, KearnsÕ definition is
reported in the following formula:
(V) (the t) $ tÕ (t  ¦ tÕ) $ e (P (e))  (at (e,t) Ú at (e,tÕ))
[where: the = individual quantifier;  = the relation of proper subpart; P = the relevant
predicate of events]
In prose: For an individually quantified interval t, for some tÕ  (where t is a proper subset of
tÕ) and for some event e instantiating the predicate P, e occurs at t  or e occurs at tÕ.  Let us
consider a simple case:
(13) At 5 oÕclock, Jane was playing the piano.
Here, 5 oÕclock individuates the FP (corresponding to t in (V)). But even when FP is not
overtly stated, it can always be recovered through a broader context as a precisely localizable
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instant (or possibly, in languages like English, as a larger interval 5). What (13) says is that
the event of playing the piano was going on at least at 5 oÕclock, but it may also be the case
that it went on for some time afterwards. Indeed, this sentence is compatible with any of the
following situations:
- Jane starts to play at 4, is still playing at 5, and stops immediately afterwards
- Jane starts to play at 4, is still playing at 5, and carries on until 7
- Jane starts to play more or less at 5, and stops immediately afterwards
- Jane starts to play more or less at 5, and carries on until 7. 6
Example (13) as such says nothing for or against these possible developments. All it says is
that the event of playing is going on at 5 oÕ clock. This corresponds quite naturally to the
speakersÕ intuitions about progressive sentences. 7
But what about the problematic cases that we considered above, those involving telic
predicates? In this connection, Kearns seems apparently satisfied with both ParsonsÕ and
DowtyÕs solution. On the one hand, she incorporates ParsonsÕ idea of the recategorization of
telic predicates (p.293). However, she claims that it is not the progressive as such which
performs the transformation, for the predicates that undergo it are intrinsically ambiguous
between a telic and an atelic reading. This clearly amounts to depleting the real impact of
ParsonsÕ treatment. But since, as shown in ¤ 3, the solution viewing the progressive as an
Ôactionality sensitiveÕ operator ultimately does not work, we may disregard this aspect. 8 On
the other hand, Kearns also incorporates a counterfactual version of DowtyÕs view concerning
the Òimperfective paradoxÓ. Roughly, this says that if the event of e.g. (3) could continue
beyond FP, it would be completed. At the same time, however, she adds (among other
criticisms) that this is not part of the actual definition of the progressive, but a mere pragmatic
extension of it. The counterfactual analysis is just Òa highly productive predicate formation
rule, generally used for purposeful human activities or processes where custom and
experience support the classification of a process as of a typically goal-directed kindÓ (p.299).
In other words, it is natural to expect that telic predicates eventually reach completion if
nothing prevents it, but obviously this is not a necessary requirement. Indeed, the Òat least at
5 Kearns is among the few scholars who implicitly admits the possibility for FP in English to be an
interval, rather than a single instant, as shown by her main example: John was playing the piano from 10
to 11.  As shown in Bertinetto (1995) and Bertinetto et al. (to appear), this is a relevant feature which
opposes some languages to others.
6 One might wonder whether the following situation is also allowed by (V):
- Jane started exactly at 5, and stops immediately afterwards.
Although this sounds pragmatically implausible, there may be cases which lend themselves pretty
naturally to this interpretazion, such as:
(i) When the mother entered the room, Paul was watching out of the window.
Suppose that Paul has been prohibited to watch out of the window until he finishes his school duties;
being weakly inclined to obedience, he turns his eyes to the window, but right at that moment his mother
opens the door to check what he is doing. In this case, it is conceivable that the event of watching lasts
for no more than a single instant. If this is so, then definition (V) would not do, for t would not
necessarily be a proper subset of tÕ. This is additional reason to consider the reformulation provided in fn.
7. However, it is possible that even in a case like (i) the total duration of the event must be larger than a
single instant, so that KearnsÕ formulation would still hold in this respect.
7 However, there seems to be a problem with this formulation. The presence of the disjunctive operator,
given its standard interpretation, makes the validity of the second disjunct vacuous with respect to the
validation of the whole formula. Note, by the way, that I am assuming that the first disjunct be true, for
otherwise even the second would be false and the entire disjunction could not be satisfied. But there is a
way to circumvent this problem. This consist in replacing the disjunctive operator by a conjunctive one,
and the relation of proper inclusion by one of improper inclusion. Here is the proposed reformulation:
(VÕ) (the: t) $ tÕ (t  Í  tÕ) $ e (P (e))  (at (e,t)  & at (e,tÕ)).
The reader may easily check that sentence (10) is satisfied by this formula for exactly the same
circumstances specified above, with the advantage, though, over KearnsÕ formulation, that the validity of
each conjunct (hence, its contribution to the validity of the entire formula) is explicitly stated.
8 As observed in (7,a), not all accomplishments are ambiguous between a telic and an atelic reading. Thus,
KearnsÕ solution is in this respect even worse than ParsonsÕ one. The latter scholar could at least claim
that the progressive on the one hand and the remaining detelicizing devices on the other hand have a
different behaviour with respect to the detelicization of the predicate (compare (7,a) and (8)). Although
the details of this proposal would be difficult to implement, Parsons could try to defend the idea that there
are different degrees of detelicization. Kearns, however, is forced to defend the highly implausible
position that there are two homophonous predicates extract a tooth, one telic and one atelic.
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FPÓ relation expressed by (V) holds for both atelic and telic predicates, because a telic event
may go on for some time beyond FP, regardless of whether or not it reaches its final goal.
Thus, the rationale for KearnsÕ move concerning the imperfective paradox seems to be the
following. The speaker is obviously invited to draw pragmatic inferences from progressive
sentences containing telic predicates, but these inferences do not pertain to the semantics of
the progressive, whose satisfaction is insured by the fact that the event goes on Òat least at
FPÓ, and may possibly go on afterwards provided no impediment occurs (possibly reaching
completion if the predicate is telic).
As Kearns (1991), Delfitto & Bertinetto (1995) make use of the notion of subpart, but they
refer it to the event itself, rather than to the time at which the event takes place. This
modification allows a unified treatment of both the progressive and the habitual aspect within
the category of imperfectivity, a move motivated by the existence of many languages in
which the same tenses may express both aspectual values. It is impossible to develop here all
the details of the argumentation. Suffice it to say that an important ingredient of the approach
is the assumption that FP is the object of a presupposition of ÒfamiliarityÓ. This means that
speaker and adressee must know the temporal localization of FP, even when it is not overtly
stated in the sentence containing the progressive. Further, the cardinal quantifier ÒoneÓ (in its
standard meaning of Òat least oneÓ) is applied to the event variable e, which is temporally
localized at t. This yields the following formula, which aims at rendering the overall meaning
of the imperfective aspect:
(VIÕ) ("t: contextually relevant (t))  (One e: P(e) & at (e,t)).
In the case of the habitual aspect, the part of the formula saying Òthere is at least one event of
P-ingÓ receives a straightforward interpretation: The event is repeated in a number of
occasions, whose frequency of occurrence is specified by the context. But note that this
implies a plurality of times of occurrence of each event comprised in the global (habitual)
macroevent. This interpretation is clearly ruled out in the case of the progressive, which
demands a semelfactive reading. Given this restriction, the cardinal quantifier is forced to
operate on entities other than times, namely subevents. Thus, the second part of (VIÕ) is
necessarily expanded in the following way, which captures the essential insights of KearnsÕ
formulation, avoiding its pitfalls:
(VIÕÕ) (One e: P(e)) & $eÕ(P(eÕ) & e Í eÕ ) & at (e,t).
Take e.g. (3) or (13): There is at least one subevent e of crossing (or of playing), and this is an
improper subpart of the event eÕ. Obviously, the same implications stemming from (V) apply
here too, suggesting that the continuation of the event beyond the time t is a possible, but not
necessary, development, in full agreement with the speakersÕ intuitions on the meaning of
progressive sentences.
5. Provisional conclusion.
The story of the progressive obviously does not stop here. 9 As a provisional conclusion, I
would just dare to propose the following points, which appear to me to be fairly robust:
- The progressive is a truly aspectual operator, rather than an actional operator (cf. ¤ 3);
- the progressive is a Òpartialization operatorÓ on events (cf. ¤ 4);
- the possible telicity of the predicate does not constitute a semantic problem, for no more
than a single portion of the event is put into focus by the progressive (cf. ¤ 2);
- in the extreme case, i.e. with strictly punctual verbs, the portion of the event put into focus
by the progressive may be the only atom of event of which the predicate consists (cf. ¤ 3);
- nevertheless, the possible completion of telic events may be the matter of relevant
pragmatic inferences in a decision-making procedure; this seems to be the ultimate impact
of the long debate on the so-called Ôimperfective paradoxÕ (cf. ¤ 2).
9 Further proposals essentially incorporating the view of the progressive as a Òpartialization operatorÕ may
be found in Jackendoff (1991) and Mc Clure (1994).
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